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ABSTRACT

SATISFICING THEORY AND NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES

Matthew Nokleby
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Master of Science

Satisficing game theory is an alternative to traditional non-cooperative game
theory which offers increased flexibility in modeling players’ social interactions. However, satisficing players with conflicting attitudes may implement dysfunctional behaviors, leading to poor performance. In this thesis, we present two attempts to
“bridge the gap” between satisficing and non-cooperative game theory. First, we
present an evolutionary method by which players adapt their attitudes to increase
raw payoff, allowing players to overcome dysfunction. We extend the Nash equilibrium concept to satisficing games, showing that the evolutionary method presented
leads the players toward an equilibrium in their attitudes. Second, we introduce
the conditional utility functions of satisficing theory into an otherwise traditional
non-cooperative framework. While the conditional structure allows increased social
flexibility in the players’ behaviors, players maximize individual utility in the traditional sense, allowing us to apply the Nash equilibrium. We find that, by adjusting
players’ attitudes, we may alter the Nash equilibria that result.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Background
Game theory is a mathematically rigorous study of decision making when

individuals must interact with others. Individuals are modeled as “players,” each
of which must choose a strategy to enact. Typically, it is assumed that players are
self-interested and therefore play strategies that maximize their payoff. Each player’s
payoff is quantified by a utility function, which is a function of the strategies played
all of the players. This makes maximization a complex problem. Games can be
divided into two main categories: in cooperative games, players may communicate
and form binding agreements prior to play, while in non-cooperative games players do
not communicate or collaborate.
While game theory is traditionally identified with economics or sociology literature, engineers and computer scientists have increasingly used it in the design of
artificial multi-agent systems, such as air-traffic control [1, 2], cooperation in ad-hoc
networks [3, 4], and resource allocation in wireless networks [5, 6]. Agents are modeled as players in a game. In non-cooperative games, players choose strategies that
maximize individual payoff without regard for the payoffs obtained by others. While
a player does consider the strategies played by others, it is only because their actions
may affect its utility. Individual maximization, also called individual rationality, leads
players to the well-known Nash equilibrium [7], where the players choose strategies
such that no single player may increase its utility by changing strategies.
While the maximization of raw payoff is a simple and defensible criterion, this
approach has several drawbacks. First, Nash equilibria often lead to highly inefficient
results where players each earn low payoff [8]. Second, humans rarely act entirely
1

out of self interest, particularly in social situations. As noted by Sen, “The purely
economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic theory has much
been preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose
preference ordering” [9, p. 15]. However, incorporating social considerations into
players’ utility functions is a difficult task.
Satisficing game theory [10] has recently been proposed as a means to address
social factors in decision-making. It differs from classical game theory in two main
ways. First, players’ utility functions conform to a probabilistic syntax. Players’
utilities are defined conditionally on the strategies preferred by other players. We then
marginalize the conditional utilities as in probability theory. The “marginal” utility
produced intrinsically incorporates the preferences of other players. Second, players
posses two utility functions: one to quantify the benefits of a particular strategy
and one to quantify its costs. A strategy for which the benefits outweigh the costs is
considered “satisficing.” The satisficing approach is particularly useful for engineering
applications, where taking an action may consume resources such as fuel, power, or
computation time. The flexibility afforded by these distinctions naturally incorporates
social considerations into players’ utilities, allowing for sophisticated behaviors in
artificial systems [11, 12].
It should be noted, however, that satisficing game theory represents a significant departure from classical game theory. While the marginal utilities—which are
typically used in choosing strategies—are functions of other players’ preferences, they
are not functions of the strategies played by other players. That is, satisficing players
consider the preferences, but not the actions, of other players in making decisions.
As a result, satisficing players may play strategies that are difficult to justify given
other players’ actions. Satisficing theory and classical game theory are two almost entirely separate decision theories with little common ground. The considerable body
of knowledge relating to classical game theory therefore simply does not apply to
satisficing players.

2

1.2

Contributions
In this thesis, we attempt to make meaningful connections between satisficing

theory and non-cooperative game theory, allowing the social flexibility afforded by
satisficing theory while avoiding incoherent behaviors. Further, these connections
allow us to apply the theoretical results of traditional non-cooperative game theory.
First, we introduce an element of raw utility maximization into satisficing
games by allowing the evolution of players’ attitudes. In satisficing games, players’
conditional utilities are often parameterized. These parameters, which we refer to
as the players’ attitudes, characterize the dependence of a player’s utilities on those
of the other players and greatly affect the strategies eventually played. We augment
the satisficing game by introducing a classical utility representing the raw payoff to
each player. This utility is a function of the strategies played by all of the players.
Therefore, we consider the utility of exhibiting particular attitudes by a two-step
mapping: attitudes map to the strategies played, which map to raw payoffs.
This leads us to define a non-cooperative game in the players’ attitudes rather
than in their strategies. We present a method by which players modify their attitudes
according to the attitudes of other players and the raw payoff earned. In this method,
which is based upon the replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, players
modify their attitudes to improve individual payoffs. The dynamics leads the players
towards a Nash equilibrium in their attitudes, which we call an attitude equilibrium.
We apply this approach to the Ultimatum game, a simple two-player game.
Second, we introduce the highly useful concept of conditional utility functions
into an otherwise standard non-cooperative framework. We retain the conditional
utility structure proposed by satisficing theory, but shed the dual-utility concept. As
in satisficing theory, players may condition their utilities on the utilities of others and
are marginalized to form utility functions that incorporate others’ utilities. However,
we define the conditional utilities such that the marginal utilities are functions of
the strategies chosen by all of the players. Thus, the marginal utilities are functions
of other players’ preferences and actions, rather than only on their actions (as in
traditional non-cooperative theory) or their preferences (as in satisficing theory).
3

After solving for the players’ marginal utilities, we can maximize individual
utility in the sense of traditional non-cooperative games. We apply traditional solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium to the proposed framework. We also
examine the Ultimatum game under this framework. The results are highly encouraging, suggesting that players still exhibit social behaviors similar to that of satisficing
theory. However, the powerful tools of classical game theory still apply.
1.3

Organization
In Chapter 2, we familiarize the reader with the basics of non-cooperative game

theory. We define a classical game and formally define the Nash equilibrium. We also
discuss extensive-form games, where players make their moves sequentially rather
than simultaneously, and define the subgame perfect equilibrium. We also introduce
the Ultimatum game, and discuss its difficulties under classical game theory.
In Chapter 3, we introduce satisficing game theory. We present the probabilistic structure of the players’ utility functions and formally define the solution concepts
that characterize satisficing strategies. We also review a satisficing formulation of
the Ultimatum game, and show that players with incompatible attitudes may play
incoherent strategies.
Chapter 4 details the attitude dynamics. First, we describe the augmented
framework required and define the attitude equilibrium. We summarize the replicator dynamics and extend the dynamics to satisficing games, creating the attitude
dynamics, which leads to an attitude equilibrium. Finally, we show the results of
applying this method to the satisficing formulation of the Ultimatum game.
In Chapter 5, we apply the conditional utilities to non-cooperative games.
After reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of classical utility functions, we show
that conditional utilities can be reconciled with the requirements of classical utilities.
We propose a conditional-utility model for the Ultimatum game, and show that the
subgame perfect equilibrium changes with the players’ attitudes.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and suggests areas of further research.

4

1.4

Notation
We use capital letters (A, B, etc.) to denote sets, and |A| denotes the cardinal-

ity of set A. Boldfaced lowercase letters (x, y, etc.) refer to vectors, while boldfaced
capitals (F, G, etc.) refer to matrices. Throughout most of this thesis, we do not
distinguish between column and row vectors, as the distinction is unimportant. However, when we perform matrix-vector multiplication, vectors are explicitly defined as
column vectors. Finally, since mass functions play a dual role as players’ utilities,
we use expanded notation for clarity. The function pX (x) represents the marginal
probability mass function over random variable X, or pX (x) = P r(X = x). The
conditional probability mass function pX|Y (x|y) denotes the probability that X = x
under the assumption that the random variable Y takes on value y.
1.5

A Final Note
In game-theoretic texts, there is often question over which personal pronouns

(“he” or “she”) are most appropriate when referring to the players. Since the players
typically are not intrinsically endowed with gender, this choice is occasionally motivated by an author’s opinion on gender issues. In this thesis, we use the neutral
pronoun “it” when referring to players. There are two reasons for this. First, it is the
author’s opinion that a technical thesis is not the place for a sociological statement,
and this choice neatly sidesteps the issue. Second, it underscores the fact that, in
the end, the “players” discussed herein are mathematical abstractions rather than
sentient beings. While we often anthropomorphize them by referring to their preferences, attitudes, or self-interest, the players do not participate in any true reasoning.
We must acknowledge that the mathematical models presented here and elsewhere—
useful as they may be—represent at best a crude approximation of the intractably
complex process of human decision-making.

5
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Chapter 2
Non-cooperative Game Theory
In this chapter we present several basic concepts and results from classical noncooperative game theory. We formally define a non-cooperative game and discuss the
Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Finally, we present the Ultimatum game and discuss its difficulties under
traditional game theory.
2.1

Formalization
We begin by defining a set of n players I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each player i ∈ I

has a set Si of pure strategies, or the actions which the player may implement. For
simplicity, we restrict our attention to games with finite pure-strategy sets. A purestrategy profile s = (s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ) is an n-dimensional vector where each element si
is a member of player i’s pure-strategy set Si . The set of pure-strategy profiles is
the pure-strategy space, which is the Cartesian product S = ×ni=1 Si of the individual
players’ pure-strategy sets. Finally, each player i has a scalar payoff function πi (s),
which quantifies the utility obtained by player i from the implementation of the
strategy profile s ∈ S.
Mixed strategies are probability distributions over players’ pure-strategy sets.
If we denote |Si | by mi , then We can characterize a mixed strategy as an mi P
dimensional vector xi with the constraints k∈Si xik = 1 and xik ≥ 0. Each element
xik represents the probability that player i plays pure strategy k ∈ Si . Therefore, xi

describes a probability mass function. We assume, as is typical, that players’ mixed
strategies are probabilistically independent.

7

Since the probabilities that are the elements of xi sum to one, each vector
xi ∈ Rmi represents an element of the mi -dimensional unit simplex, which is defined
as
∆i =

(

xi ∈ Rmi :

mi
X

)

xik = 1, xik ≥ 0 .

k=1

(2.1)

The unit simplex is a convex set of normalized vectors upon which we impose a geometric interpretation. The vertices of the unit simplex are the elementary vectors
e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0, · · · , 0), etc. These vertices represent the pure strategies, which we may regard as “degenerate” mixed strategies with all of the probability
mass on a single element of Si .
The interior of the unit simplex is the set of vectors which have only nonzero
entries:
int(∆i ) = {xi ∈ ∆i : xik > 0, ∀k}.

(2.2)

In game-theoretic terms, vectors on the interior of the mixed-strategy simplex assign
non-zero probability to each pure strategy in Si .
The mixed-strategy space Θ is the Cartesian product of the players’ mixedstrategy simplexes:
Θ = ×ni=1 ∆i .

(2.3)

A mixed-strategy profile is a vector of mixed strategies x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ∈ Θ where
each element xi , i ∈ I is a mixed-strategy xi ∈ ∆i . Each entry xik of the mixedstrategy profile represents the probability with which player i will play pure strategy
k ∈ Si .
With the mixed-strategy profile well-defined, we may discuss players’ expected
utility. Since the players’ mixed strategies are independent, the probability that a
particular (pure-) strategy profile will occur is the product of the individual probabilities
P r(s) =

n
Y
i=1

8

xisi .

(2.4)

The expected utility ui (x) to player i is the sum of the payoffs for each pure strategy
multiplied by the probability that they occur:
ui (x) =

X

πi (s)P r(s)

X

πi (s)

(2.5)

s∈S

=

xisi .

(2.6)

i=1

s∈S

2.2

n
Y

Nash Equilibria
Under traditional game theory, each player seeks to maximize expected utility

by selecting an optimal mixed strategy. However, since each other player also attempts to maximize utility, it is difficult to define an optimal mixed strategy. In [7],
Nash defines a non-cooperative solution. In non-cooperative games, players may not
communicate or negotiate prior to play. However, it is typically assumed that players
have full knowledge of the each other’s payoff functions and that the players’ intent
to maximize utility is common knowledge.
Definition 2.1 A Nash equilibrium is a mixed-strategy profile x∗ ∈ Θ such that
ui (x∗1 , . . . , x∗i , . . . , x∗n ) ≥ ui (x∗1 , . . . , x′i , . . . , x∗n )

(2.7)

for each x′i ∈ ∆i and for each i ∈ I.
That is, a mixed-strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player—acting alone—
can improve its expected utility by choosing a different mixed strategy. If a player
chooses a different mixed strategy than x∗i , and each other player continues to play
its part of x∗ , then player i’s expected utility can only decrease.
Perhaps the most famous example of the Nash equilibrium is the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [8]. In this scenario, two suspects are separately interrogated by police.
They have committed two crimes: a minor offense and a major felony. The authorities
have sufficient evidence to convict them of the lesser crime, but need testimony to
convict either of them of the felony. The interrogators offer a deal: in return for
testifying against the other, a prisoner will be forgiven for the lesser offense. However,
9

even after agreeing to testify, a prisoner can be convicted of the greater crime if the
other prisoner also testifies. Here, the set of players is I = {1, 2}, and each player’s
pure strategy set is S1 = S2 = (Not Confess, Confess). We express the players’
payoff functions in the payoff matrix in Table 2.1. Note that the entries in the matrix
represent payoff rather than prison time, with higher payoff implying less prison time.

Table 2.1: Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Player 2
Not Confess
Confess

Player
Not Confess
(4, 4)
(1, 5)

1
Confess
(5, 1)
(2, 2)

From the payoff matrix, we can see that the unique Nash equilibrium is the
pure-strategy profile s = (Confess, Confess), where each player testifies against the
other. Even though both players would be better off under s = (Not Confess, Not
Confess), self-interest drives the players towards an inefficient, albeit stable, equilibrium point.
Theorem 2.1 Every game with a finite pure-strategy space has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Here we reproduce the proof given by Nash in [7]. First, we define a family
of continuous functions of x ∈ Θ by
φisi (x) = max(0, ui (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , esi , xi+1 , . . . , xn ) − ui (x)).

(2.8)

In other words, φisi is the increase in expected utility (if any) that player i gets if it
changes from its current mixed strategy xi to the pure strategy si , denoted by the
degenerate mixed strategy esi .
Using φisi , we define a mapping that updates the players’ mixed-strategy profiles according to the relative payoffs. Define the mapping T (x) = x′ by
x′isi =

xisi + φisi (x)
P
, ∀i ∈ I.
1 + s∈Si φis (x)
10

(2.9)

Since T is a continuous mapping from Θ to itself, and since Θ can always be represented by a unit ball, T is guaranteed to have at least one fixed point by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem.
Finally, we show that the fixed points of T correspond to Nash equilibria. If
∗
x is a fixed point of T , then φisi (x∗ ) must be zero for every i and si . Therefore, no
player can improve its expected utility by changing to a pure strategy. Since no pure
strategy can yield higher payoff, neither can any mixed strategy, making x∗ a Nash
equilibrium. Since a fixed point of T must exist, and since any fixed point of T must
be a Nash equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium must exist.
Theorem 2.1 guarantees that an equilibrium exists in mixed strategies. While many
games have pure-strategy equilibria, such equilibria do not exist in general, as shown
by the familiar Rock-Paper-Scissors game. In this game, two players (I = {1, 2})
simultaneously show one of three signs (S1 = S2 = {Rock, Paper, Scissors}). Rock
defeats Scissors, Paper defeats Rock, and Scissors defeats Paper. Otherwise, a tie
results. These payoffs are formalized in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Payoff matrix for Rock-Paper-Scissors.

Player 1
Player 2
Rock
Paper Scissors
Rock
(0, 0) (−5, 5) (5, −5)
Paper
(5, −5) (0, 0) (−5, 5)
Scissors (−5, 5) (5, −5) (0, 0)

A careful look at Table 2.2 reveals that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Regardless of the pure strategies played, at least one player has incentive to switch to
a different pure strategy. However, it is straightforward to show that if both players
choose the mixed strategy x1 = x2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), neither player can improve
expected utility by choosing another mixed strategy.

11

2.2.1

Extensive-Form Games
While every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, it may not be unique. This has

motivated a number of equilibrium refinements, perhaps the most notable of which is
the subgame perfect equilibrium [13]. To discuss the subgame perfect equilibrium, we
must first consider games in extensive form. In extensive form games we explicitly
define the order in which players make their moves and the information available to
each player at each stage. We restrict our attention to games with perfect information,
where each player has complete knowledge of the moves of each previous player. For
a more comprehensive study of extensive-form games, see [14].
An extensive-form game will often have significantly different strategic properties. For example, consider a two-player game where player 1 makes its decision
first, and player 2 makes its decision after observing player 1’s action. In this case,
player 2’s pure strategy s2 is specified as a function of the pure strategy played by
player 1. That is, player 2 chooses among the functions s2 : S1 → S2 that map from
player 1’s pure-strategy set to player 2’s pure-strategy set. We may think of these
strategies as plans for all possible “contingencies”: whatever player 1 does, player 2
has a response defined by the function s2 (s1 ).
Since player 1 makes its decision first, it may be able to “force” player 2 into
making a desired decision. Or, alternatively, player 2 may be able to exploit the fact
that player 1 has already made its move.1
Consider the game Chicken, where two players drive cars at each other to see
who, if anyone, will swerve. The set of players is I = {1, 2} and the players’ pure
strategy sets are S1 = S2 = {Swerve, Not Swerve}. We present a simple form of the
game where each player makes its decision once, without the possibility of changing
its mind afterward. We express the payoff functions in Table 2.3. If neither player
1

In the Paper-Rock-Scissors game, sequential play significantly alters the game. No matter what
player 1 does, player 2 can win the game.
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Table 2.3: Payoff matrix for Chicken in normal form.

Player 2
Player 1
Swerve
Not Swerve
Swerve
(0, 0)
(−10, 10)
Not Swerve (10, −10) (−100, −100)

swerves, the cars collide and both players incur significant negative utility. If both
players swerve, no utility is gained. However, if one player swerves and the other does
not, the non-swerving player “wins” and garners positive utility while the losing player
incurs negative utility. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: s = (Swerve, Not
Swerve) and s = (Not Swerve, Swerve). Unfortunately, in the normal-form game, it
is difficult to say which equilibrium should result from rational players.
In an extensive-form version of Chicken, however, the analysis is more interesting. Extensive-form games are commonly displayed in a game tree, which displays
graphically the order in which players move, the players’ choices at each stage, and
the payoffs to the players. The game tree for the extensive form of Chicken is shown
in Figure 2.1. Player 1 moves first, and chooses whether or not to swerve. Player 2,
after observing player 1’s choice, also chooses whether or not to swerve. The resulting
payoffs are the same as those from the payoff matrix in Table 2.3.

1
Swerve
2
Swerve
0, 0

Not Swerve
2

Not Swerve Swerve
−10, 10

10,-10

Not Swerve
-100,-100

Figure 2.1: Game tree for Chicken in extensive form.
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We may also represent the extensive-form game as a normal-form game and
display a payoff matrix, as in Table 2.4. That is, rather than viewing the game sequentially where player 2 moves after player 1, we can view it as a game where the
players choose strategies simultaneously, except that player 2’s strategy is a function
of player 1’s strategy. That is, player 1 chooses a strategy, and player two chooses
a “contingency” strategy that is a function of player 1’s choice. Therefore, the distinction between this new payoff matrix and the original one given in Table 2.3 is
that player 2’s strategies are expressed as functions of player 1’s actions, where (x, y)
indicates that player 2 plays x if player 1 swerves and plays y if player 1 does not.
For convenience, we abbreviate “Swerve” and “Not Swerve” as “S” and “NS,” respectively.

Table 2.4: Payoff matrix for Chicken in extensive form.

Player 1
(S, S)
Swerve
(0, 0)
Not Swerve (10, −10)

Player 2
(S, NS)
(NS, S)
(0, 0)
(−10, 10)
(−100, −100) (10, −10)

(NS, NS)
(−10, 10)
(−100, −100)

There are three pure-strategy Nash equilibria, each of which correspond to a
pure-strategy equilibrium from Table 2.3. The first two, which result in the same
eventual actions, occur when player 1 does not swerve and player 2 plays (S, S) or
(NS, S). In the third, player 1 swerves and player 2 plays (NS, NS) and refuses to
swerve regardless of player 1’s actions.
To choose between these equilibria, we define the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In a subgame, a history of moves has already been played. In Chicken, for example,
there are three subgames. First, there is the trivial subgame where no move has been
played, and both players must choose a strategy. There are also two subgames where
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player 1 has chosen whether or not to swerve. In these subgames, player 2 plays
alone. Note that subgames themselves are well-defined games since they have a set of
players, a pure-strategy space, and payoff functions. We may therefore consider the
Nash equilibria of these subgames, which motivates the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Definition 2.2 A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is a Nash
equilibrium of every possible subgame.
For Chicken, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Let’s consider
each subgame individually. Obviously, each of the three equilibria are still equilibria
of the first subgame, since it is equivalent to the full game. Next, consider the
subgame where player 1 has chosen to swerve. Since only player 2 chooses an action,
the equilibria are simply the actions that maximize player 2’s payoff. Here, s2 = (NS,
S) and s2 = (NS, NS) are equilibria, so s2 = (S, S) cannot be player 2’s part of a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, consider the last subgame where player 1 has
chosen not to swerve. Here, the equilibria are s2 = (S, S) and s2 = (NS, S), which
eliminates s2 = (NS, NS) as player 2’s part of a the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Thus, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, player 1 chooses not to
swerve, and player 2 chooses s2 = (NS, S) and ends up swerving. In a common abuse
of notation, we say that s = (Not Swerve, Swerve) is the subgame perfect equilibrium
even though, strictly speaking, player 2’s strategy is a function of player 1’s choice.
Note that only the “reactive” strategy, where player 2 does the opposite of player
1, survives as an equilibrium of each subgame. In this sense the subgame perfect
equilibrium can be said to remove equilibria that result from “non-credible” threats.
For example, the strategy (NS, NS) is not a credible threat because player 2, after
observing that player 1 chooses not to swerve, will swerve to avoid a collision and
maximize utility.
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2.3

The Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game has become a common example for illustrating the

weakness of classical game theory as a model for human behavior. The game consists
of two players (I = {1, 2}): the proposer (player 1) and the responder (player 2).
The proposer and the responder must agree on the division of a dollar. The game
is played sequentially: the proposer offers some fraction to the responder, who must
decide whether or not to accept it. If the responder accepts the offer, they divide the
dollar as proposed. Otherwise, each player receives nothing.
The proposer’s strategy space is typically defined as the (uncountable) unit
interval [0, 1], which complicates analysis. Thus, we pattern our presentation after
Gale et al. [15] and examine a simple quantization which captures the “heart” of the
game while simplifying analysis. In this version, the proposer offers either a high or
low fraction (S1 = {High, Low}) to the responder, who again may choose to accept
or reject (S2 = {Accept, Reject}) the offer. The payoffs are shown in Table 2.5. We
use h and l to denote the numerical value of the high and low fraction, respectively,
with h > l.

Table 2.5: Payoff matrix for the Ultimatum minigame.

Proposer
High
Low

Responder
Accept
Reject
(1 − h, h) (0, 0)
(1 − l, l) (0, 0)

The unique Nash equilibrium (which is also subgame perfect) for this version
of the Ultimatum game is s = (Low, Accept). We can also show that, regardless of
the quantization, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the proposer
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offers the smallest possible nonzero fraction and the responder accepts it. However,
this strategy is rarely implemented by human decision-makers. Real-life proposers are
more likely to give fair offers, and responders often reject unfair offers, even though
doing so reduces raw payoff [16, 17].
These findings suggest that players’ utility functions are affected by considerations other than raw payoff. Several models have been proposed in recent years
to account for this. Fehr and Schmidt [18] propose an “inequity aversion” model
in which players exhibit a preference for strategy profiles that limit the difference—
positive or negative—between its payoff and the payoff of the other players. If players
are sufficiently averse to unfair outcomes, more “realistic” equilibria result. In Chapter 3, we discuss a satisficing model for the Ultimatum game presented by Stirling et.
al [19] which also allows for fair outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Satisficing Game Theory
3.1

Motivation
In satisficing game theory, players eschew the assumption of individual ratio-

nality which is fundamental to non-cooperative game theory. While the simple and
reasonable assumption of rationality has given rise to a rich and successful theory,
raw maximization may be too simple, particularly in describing social situations. As
observed by Luce and Raiffa, “general game theory seems to be in part a sociological
theory which does not include any sociological assumptions. . . it may be too much to
ask that any sociology be derived from the single assumption of individual rationality,” [20, p. 196]. Satisficing game theory provides an alternative to the traditional
approach. It presents a more elaborate structure which may be more useful in modeling social behaviors. Players may directly concern themselves with the preferences
of others and do not explicitly attempt to maximize utility.
To describe this, we alter the structure of the players’ utility functions. First,
each player possesses two utilities: one to characterize the benefits associated with
taking an action, and one to characterize the costs. For a satisficing player, an action
for which the benefits outweigh the costs is a “good enough” or satisficing decision and
may be implemented. Second, the players’ utility functions share a common syntax
with probability mass functions, allowing probabilistic concepts such as conditioning
and independence to be applied to players’ preferences—albeit with a significantly
different interpretation.
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The use of probability mass functions to describe a player’s preferences rather
than a random phenomenon is an unusual one, and warrants further explanation.
Stirling [21] provides a rigorous mathematical justification. It is shown that players’
utilities must conform to a probabilistic syntax in order to satisfy several desirable
axioms. We present a similar argument in Appendix A. Fortunately, however, the
benefits of such a model may also be appreciated intuitively.
For two discrete random phenomena X and Y , where Y is dependent on X,
we can express the probabilities for Y by the conditional mass function pY |X (y|x).
The conditional mass function gives hypothetical probabilities of Y : what would be
the probability that Y = y if we knew that X took on the value x? If we know
the probabilities for X = x, we can compute the marginal mass function accordP
ing to basic rules of probability theory: pY (y) = x pY |X (y|x)pX (x). The marginal
mass function is a convex combination of the different conditional mass functions described by pY |X (y|x), with the weights of the convex combination given by pX (x). The
marginal probabilities for Y are therefore influenced—but not entirely dictated—by
the probabilities of X.
Similarly, players’ preferences may depend upon the preferences of others, allowing their utilities (which are called social utilities) to be expressed as conditional
mass functions. The conditional mass functions allow for hypothetical expressions of
utility: what would player 1’s utilities be if player 2 unilaterally preferred a particular action? We may compute player 1’s marginal utilities—which are the utilities
used for decision-making—by summing the conditional utilities over player 2’s actual
preferences. This structure allows players to consider not simply what actions other
players may prefer, but how strong the preferences for action are. Their utilities are
influenced by others’ preferences in a controlled manner which does not require them
to discard their own preferences.
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3.2

Formalization
As in the classical theory, we first define the set of n players I = {1, 2, · · · , n}.

We denote each player’s pure-strategy set as Ui . A strategy profile is an n-dimensional
vector u ∈ U , where U = ×ni=1 Ui is the pure-strategy space. In satisficing game theory,
we will concern ourselves only with pure strategies and not consider mixed strategies.
So far, the formalization of satisficing theory is identical to the classical formalization. However, in defining the players’ utilities, satisficing theory is significantly
different than the classical approach. First, each player possesses two social utilities.
To describe these, we first define two “selves” or perspectives from which each player
may consider his actions. The selecting self of player i considers actions strictly in
terms of their associated benefits, while the rejecting self considers actions only in
terms of the costs incurred in implementing them. These selves are described by
the selectability function pSi (ui ) and rejectability function pRi (ui ), respectively. Note
that, unlike traditional utility functions, social utilities are defined over player i’s
pure-strategy set Ui rather than over the pure-strategy space U .
Since social utilities are mass functions, they are normalized across the purestrategy sets and therefore describe the relative benefit and cost associated with a
pure strategy ui ∈ U . They also provide players with a formal definition of good
enough. A pure strategy is “good enough,” or satisficing, if the relative benefit is at
least as great as the relative cost. This permits us to define the individually satisficing
set for player i as

Σi = u ∈ Ui : pSi (u) ≥ qpRi (u) ,

(3.1)

where q is the index of caution. Typically, q = 1, but a player may adjust its definition
of “good enough” by changing q. Setting q ≤ 1 ensures that Σi is not empty. We may
combine the players’ individually satisficing sets by forming the satisficing rectangle

21

ℜ12···n , which is defined as the Cartesian product
ℜ12···n = ×ni=1 Σi .

(3.2)

Any strategy profile u ∈ ℜ12···n is simultaneously satisficing to each player in terms
of its individual preferences.
When specifying the players’ conditional utilities, it is convenient to express
the relationship between players graphically. In probability theory, relationships between random variables are expressed in Bayesian networks. Similarly, in satisficing
theory the relationship between players’ utilities are expressed in praxeic networks.1
The praxeic network consists of a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the nodes
are the selecting and rejecting perspectives of each player and the edges are the conditional utility functions. For example, consider the simple two-player community
depicted in Figure 3.1. For each player, the rejecting preferences depend on the
selecting preferences of the other player, while the selecting preferences are independent. For large communities where the interdependence structure is highly complex,
we may employ established methods such as Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm
[22] to analyze the community.
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Figure 3.1: A simple praxeic network.
1

The term praxeic is derived from praxeology, which refers to the study of human behavior.
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In discussing the players’ social utilities, we retain the terminology of probability theory. In the community from Figure 3.1, we refer to Player 1’s conditional rejectability function, denoted pR1 |S2 (v1 |u2 ). The conditional mass function
expresses hypothetical utility: if Player 2’s selecting preferences entirely favored strategy u2 , what would be Player 1’s rejectability for v1 ? As with probability mass functions, we may compute the marginal rejectability by summing over the conditionals,
P
pR1 (v1 ) = u2 ∈U2 pR1 |S2 (v1 |u2 )pS2 (u2 ). The marginal utilities determine the individually satisficing sets and the satisficing rectangle. If a utility is independent (such as

the selectability functions in this example), its marginal is expressed directly, without
conditioning.
With the marginal and conditional utilities defined, we define the interdependence function pS1 ···Sn R1 ···Rn (u1 , · · · , un ; v1 , · · · , vn ), which is the joint mass function
of all players’ selecting and rejecting preferences. By the chain rule of probability theory, the interdependence function for this example is pS1 S2 R1 R2 (u1 , u2 ; v1 , v2 ) =
pR1 |S2 (v1 |u2 )pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 )pS1 (u1 )pS1 (u1 ).
Satisficing games are characterized by the triple (I, U, pS1 ···Sn R1 ···Rn ). From
this information, all necessary marginal utilities can be computed and the satisficing
rectangle can be determined.
3.3

The Ultimatum Game
In this section we review the satisficing model of the Ultimatum game pre-

sented in [19]. It provides both an example of how players’ conditional utilities are
defined and an illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of the satisficing approach. As in Chapter 2, the set of players is I = {1, 2} and the pure-strategy sets
are U1 = {High, Low} and U2 = {Accept, Reject}.
In the satisficing model, the players’ behavior is governed by their attitudes.
The proposer’s attitudes are described by its intemperance index τ ∈ [0, 1]. If τ = 1,
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the proposer is exclusively concerned with maximizing payoff. As τ decreases, it
is increasingly willing to compromise. The responder’s attitudes are described by
its indignation index δ ∈ [0, 1]. If δ = 0, it will accept any fraction offered. As δ
increases, the responder becomes increasingly willing to forfeit its share in order to
punish the proposer.
This is modeled explicitly by the players’ social utilities. In this game, the
selectability functions are associated with the benefit—the fraction of the dollar received. The rejectability functions express the risk of losing the entire dollar due
to the responder’s rejection. Since the proposer acts first, its utilities are specified
unconditionally. The proposer’s selectability is concerned with benefit, and the desire
to keep the larger fraction for is determined by the intemperance index:

pS1 (u1 ) =




1 − τ, for u1 = High


τ,

.

(3.3)

for u1 = Low

To avoid losing the entire dollar, the proposer considers the responder’s indignation
index in constructing the rejectability function:

pR1 (v1 ) =




τ (1 − δ),

for v1 = High

.

(3.4)



1 − τ (1 − δ), for u1 = Low

The responder, who plays second, conditions its utility functions on those of
the proposer. It wishes to maintain its fraction of the dollar while reserving the right
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to punish an intemperate proposer. The responder’s conditional rejectability is

pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 ) =





1,







0,

for u2 = Accept|u1 = High
for u2 = Reject|u1 = High

.

(3.5)




1 − δ, for u2 = Accept|u1 = Low







δ,
for u2 = Reject|u1 = Low

If the proposer unilaterally favors the high offer (τ = 0), the responder will entirely
prefer to accept the offer. However, if the proposer favors the low offer (τ = 1),
the responder prefers to reject the offer according to its indignation index δ. The
conditional rejectability encodes the same preferences, and is given by

pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 ) =




0,







1,

for u2 = Accept|u1 = High
for u2 = Reject|u1 = High

.

(3.6)




δ,
for u2 = Accept|u1 = Low







1 − δ, for u2 = Reject|u1 = Low

Summing over the conditional mass functions, the responder’s marginal utilities are

pS2 (u2 ) =

pR2 (v2 ) =




1 − τ δ, for u2 = Accept



τ δ,



τ δ,

,

(3.7)

.

(3.8)

for u2 = Reject

for u2 = Accept



1 − τ δ, for u2 = Reject
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The interdependence function for the Ultimatum game is constructed according to
the chain rule:

pS1 S2 R1 R2 (u1 , u2 ; v1 , v2 ) = pS2 |S1 (u2 |u1 )pR2 |S1 (v2 |u1 )pS1 (u1 )pR1 (v1 ).

(3.9)

With the players’ utility functions are defined, we examine their actions according to the satisficing rectangle. Recall that a pure strategy ui is individually
satisficing for player i if pSi (ui ) ≥ qpRi (ui ). In Figure 3.3 we set q = 1 and show
the satisficing rectangle as functions of τ and δ. Four possibilities result depending
on the players’ attitudes. In first region, the proposer is sufficiently greedy and the
responder sufficiently conciliatory that u = (Low, Accept) is the unique member of
the satisficing rectangle. If τ is lower and/or δ is higher, the players implement u =
(High, Accept). In the remaining two regions, the responder is sufficiently indignant
that the offers are rejected.
Figure 3.3 shows a few interesting properties that are typical of satisficing
games. Consider a responder with an indignation index of, say, δ = 0.6. Notice that
the responder’s actions are not simply (or even primarily) based on the offer proposed.
For τ = 0.75, the low offer is accepted. However, if the proposer’s intemperance index
increases much higher, the proposer refuses. It accepts an low offer from a somewhat
moderate proposer and refuses it from an intemperate one. In this highly sophisticated
behavior, the responder punishes the proposer not for its actions, but for its attitudes.
Such social behaviors may be desirable in the synthesis of artificial decision-makers,
and are difficult to model under non-cooperative game theory.
However, this framework also allows for undesirable behavior. Consider the
region where the responder rejects the high fraction. The intemperance index is
sufficiently high that the responder punishes even a moderately intemperate proposer. Such dysfunctional behavior is somewhat common in satisficing games and is
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Figure 3.2: (τ, δ) regions for the satisficing rectangles.

a consequence of the structure of the utilities: players’ utilities depend on the others’
attitudes rather than the strategies they implement. Note that this poor performance
is quite distinct from the difficulties under non-cooperative game theory. In the noncooperative solution, players’ narrow focus on payoff allows the proposer to exploit
the responder. Here, an overly indignant responder ignores payoff to reject even a
high offer.
We hasten to note that dysfunctional behavior is not a failure per se of the
satisficing model. Dysfunctional societies do exist in practice, and the satisficing
model simply suggests that players with incompatible attitudes (in this case a highly
indignant responder with a moderately intemperate proposer) may act incoherently.
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However, in designing artificial societies, we typically prefer to avoid incoherent behaviors, sociologically justifiable or not.
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Chapter 4
Attitude Adaptation in Satisficing Games
We discuss how satisficing players may adjust their attitudes to increase their
payoff and overcome dysfunctional behaviors such as those shown in Chapter 3. We
augment the satisficing game by introducing a space of attitudes that each player
may exhibit and a classical utility defined for each player over the pure strategy
space. We define the attitude equilibrium, which is a Nash equilibrium in players’
attitudes. After discussing classical replicator dynamics, we show how the dynamics
can be used to adapt the attitudes of satisficing players. We then show the results of
applying the attitude dynamics to the Ultimatum game.
4.1

Attitude Equilibria
To introduce the attitude equilibrium and the attitude dynamics, we must first

embellish the structure of the satisficing game. To do this, we endow each player with
a classical (von Neumman-Morgenstern) utility function which is based solely on the
pure-strategy profile that the players implement.
Definition 4.1 An augmented satisficing game is a tuple (I, U, pS1 ···Sn R1 ···Rn , A, π(u)).
The first three elements are the set of players, the pure-strategy space, and interdependence function as normal. Additionally, we introduce the product attitude space
A = ×ni=1 Ai containing the attitudes that the players may exhibit and π(u), a vector
payoff function which describes the raw payoff to each player for implementing the
pure strategy profile u ∈ U .
Not all satisficing games may be augmented. To augment a satisficing game,
the players’ attitudes must be specified as distinct parameters in the social utilities.
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Further, we must be able to construct a “raw” payoff function that is separate from
the social utilities. Fortunately, the extension is straightforward for the Ultimatum
game. The players’ attitudes are the intemperance and indignation indices τ and
δ, yielding the pure-attitude space A = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. The payoff function π(u) is
described by the payoff matrix in Table 2.5.
The augmented satisficing game describes a two-step mapping from attitudes
to payoffs. The social utilities—determined by the interdependence function—map
the players’ attitudes to strategy profiles.1 The payoff function then maps the strategy
profile to raw payoffs.
Thus, in an augmented satisficing game, we may evaluate the raw utility of
possessing particular attitudes. To simplify notation, we will occasionally refer to
π(a), the payoff to the players for implementing the strategy profile determined by
the attitude profile a ∈ A. That is, we may think of an augmented satisficing game
as a classical non-cooperative game where players’ payoffs are determined by the
attitudes they adopt, rather than the strategies they implement.
We may also discuss mixed attitudes which, by analogy, are probability distributions over the attitudes the players exhibit. Denoting |Ui | by ki , the mixed
attitude of player i is given by a (normalized) ki -dimensional vector ci . The discussion of mixed strategies Chapter 2 applies to mixed attitudes. We assume that
players’ mixed attitudes are probabilistically independent of each other. We define
player i’s mixed-attitude simplex ∆ai and may analogously discuss its vertices and
interior. The mixed-attitude space is the Cartesian product Θa = ×ni=1 ∆ai , which
contains mixed-attitude profiles c = (c1 , c2 , . . . , cn ).
1

Here, we have glossed over the fact that the satisficing rectangle may contain multiple purestrategy profiles. For simplicity, we will assume that, if necessary, the players employ a tie-breaking
mechanism to select a unique pure-strategy profile.
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The expected utility ui (c) to player i when the players exhibit the mixedattitude profile c ∈ Θa is essentially the same as (2.5):

ui (c) =

X

πi (a)

a∈A

n
Y

ciai .

(4.1)

i=1

Players may now consider changing their attitudes if they result in poor expected
utility. This concept provides the motivation for the attitude equilibrium.
Definition 4.2 An attitude equilibrium is a mixed-attitude profile c∗ ∈ Θa such that
ui (c∗1 , . . . , c∗i , . . . , c∗n ) ≥ ui (c∗1 , . . . , c′i , . . . , c∗n )

(4.2)

for each c′i ∈ ∆ai and for each i ∈ I.
The definition for the attitude equilibrium is almost identical to that of the Nash
equilibrium. In fact, we may say that an attitude equilibrium is an equilibrium in
players’ attitudes, rather than in their strategies. Because of the analogy between the
attitude equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium, many theoretical results apply.
Theorem 4.1 Every game with a finite pure-attitude space has an attitude equilibrium.
Proof:
Since we can view any augmented satisficing game as a classical noncooperative game where the pure-attitude space takes the place of the pure-strategy
space, this result follows directly from Theorem 2.1.
As with the Nash equilibrium, the attitude equilibrium may exist only in mixed
attitudes.
For the Ultimatum game, even though the attitude spaces are continuous, it
is straightforward to show that attitude equilibria exist and that they exist in pure
attitudes. In Figure 4.1, the attitude equilibria are the shaded regions. If the players’
attitude vector lies in these regions, there is no incentive for either player to alter its
attitudes. Consider the shaded portion of the (High, Accept) region. The responder
receives maximum payoff, and therefore has no reason to deviate. Similarly, the
proposer cannot improve its payoff by changing τ . While the proposer does not earn
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maximum payoff, changing τ can only drive the responder to reject the offer, resulting
in lower payoff. Similarly, in the shaded (Low, Accept) region, altering δ can only
result in the offer being rejected. For any other pure attitude profile in A, at least
one player stands to increase payoff by changing attitudes.
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0
0
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0.6
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1

δ
Figure 4.1: Attitude equilibria for the Ultimatum game.

The players’ attitude equilibria result in the acceptance of either the high or
low offer. By contrast, the traditional Nash equilibrium results in the acceptance
of only the low offer. The attitude equilibrium provides a useful juxtaposition of
satisficing theory and individual rationality: we retain the social structure which
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allows the high fraction to be offered, but eliminate the possibility that conflicting
attitudes will result in the forfeiture of the entire dollar.
Unfortunately, the attitude equilibrium concept does not tell us which equilibrium these players will adopt. It simply says that if their attitudes lie in an equilibrium
region, neither player has incentive to deviate. Therefore, we turn to evolutionary
mechanisms to explore which equilibrium will result under different initial conditions.
4.2
4.2.1

Replicator Dynamics
Derivation
In this section we detail the classical replicator dynamics from evolutionary

game theory, described in [23]. In its simplest form the replicator dynamics involves
a two-player, symmetric2 game described by a single pure-strategy set S1 = S2 and
payoff function π(s1 , s2 ). Consider a population of players that are preprogrammed
to play some pure strategy i ∈ S1 . That is, regardless of the payoff, each player in
the population plays the strategy to which it is programmed.
Let pi (t) represent the number of players playing strategy i at time t, and let
P
p(t) = i∈S1 pi (t) represent the size of the population at time t. Finally, define the

population share for pure strategy i at t as xi (t) = pi (t)/p(t). The population share

xi (t) can be interpreted probabilistically: if we draw a member of the population
randomly at time t, it will be programmed to play i with probability xi (t). We define
the vector of population shares x(t) = (x1 (t), x2 (t), . . .). We may also interpret x(t)
probabilistically as a member of the mixed-strategy simplex ∆.
In continuous time, the members of the population are randomly paired up,
where they play the game in question and earn their payoff. In the replicator dynamics, players asexually reproduce according to their payoffs. That is, the number
2

By “symmetric,” we mean that the two players are equivalent in terms of their pure strategy
spaces and their payoff functions. In a symmetric game, we can exchange the roles of player 1 and
player 2 without effect.
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of offspring a player has is equal to its payoff. We assume that each offspring is programmed to the same pure strategy as its parent. If we let the population become
infinitely large, we can invoke the law of large numbers, and the evolution of pi (t) is
given by a deterministic differential equation:
X


π(i, j)xj (t).
ṗi (t) = u(ei , x(t)) pi (t) = pi (t)

(4.3)

j∈S1

In other words, the rate of increase in pi (t) is given by the average utility of playing
pure strategy i (denoted by the elementary vector ei ) against a member of the population (denoted by the “mixed strategy” x(t)). By the linearity of differentiation, the
total population size grows according to

ṗ(t) =

X

ṗi (t) = p(t)

XX

π(i, j)xi xj = [u(x(t), x(t))] p(t).

(4.4)

i∈S1 j∈S1

i∈S1

Of course, as the population size approaches infinity, it becomes more fruitful to
examine the evolution of the population shares, which remain finite. We start by
rearranging the definition of xi (t):
pi (t)
,
p(t)

(4.5)

p(t)xi (t) = pi (t).

(4.6)

d
d
{p(t)xi (t)} =
{pi (t)} ,
dt
dt

(4.7)

xi (t) =

Next, we differentiate both sides:

ṗ(t)xi (t) + ẋi (t)p(t) = ṗi (t),
ẋi (t)p(t) = ṗi (t) − ṗ(t)xi (t).
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(4.8)
(4.9)

Finally, we apply (4.3) and (4.4), yielding



ẋi p(t) = u(ei , x(t)) pi (t) − [u(x(t), x(t))] p(t)xi (t),


ẋi (t) = u(ei , x(t)) xi (t) − [u(x(t), x(t))] xi (t),


ẋi (t) = u(ei , x(t)) − u(x(t), x(t)) xi (t).

(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)

A population share’s rate of increase depends on its relative expected utility. If a
the expected utility of a pure strategy is more successful than average, its population
share grows, whereas less successful strategies tend to die out.
Equation (4.12) gives a complete characterization of the evolution of the infinitely large population. The evolution of the population shares is given by system
of first-order ordinary differential equations, inducing a unique solution trajectory
ξ(t, x(0)) through the initial conditions x(0). It is shown in [23] that as long as all
pure strategies are represented in the initial conditions (x(0) ∈ int(∆)), any steadystate of the dynamics is a Nash equilibrium.3 Note that this does not imply that
a steady state exists.4 Rather, if a steady-state exists under well-behaved initial
conditions, it must be a Nash equilibrium.
4.2.2

Multipopulation Dynamics
The multipopulation replicator dynamics describes evolution in asymmetric

games where players are selected from separate player populations. In the Ultimatum
game, for example, there are two player populations: a population of proposers and
a population of responders. We therefore have two distinct pure-strategy sets S1
and S2 as well as two payoff functions π1 (s1 , s2 ) and π2 (s1 , s2 ). In multipopulation
3
That is, the mixed-strategy profile x = (x∗ , x∗ ), where each player uses x∗ as its mixed strategy,
is a Nash equilibrium.
4
A common example is Rock-Paper-Scissors, described in Chapter 2. Here, the solution to the
replicator dynamics “orbits” around the mixed-strategy equilibrium, but does not approach steadystate.
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dynamics there are arbitrarily many populations, but we will restrict our attention
to the two-population case. Define a vector of population shares for each population:
x(t) describes player population 1, and y(t) describes player population 2.
At each time t a player is drawn from each population to play the game, earn
payoffs, and reproduce. The standard two-player replicator dynamics are given by a
system of differential equations similar to (4.12):



ẋi (t) = u1 (ei , y(t)) − u1 (x(t), y(t)) xi ,


ẏj (t) = u2 (ej , x(t)) − u2 (y(t), x(t)) yj .

(4.13)
(4.14)

While this system of equations preserves the intuition from (4.12), we have
stated them without justification. In [23], Weibull notes that this is just one of many
possible multi-population models. This dynamic model glosses over issues peculiar to
the multi-population system such as relative population size and the resulting relative
velocities with which the populations evolve. However, it is a convenient model
because of its simplicity and analogy with the single-population models. Many of the
theoretical results from the single-population dynamics hold; namely, the steady state
of the dynamics, given well-behaved initial conditions as before, is a Nash equilibrium.
4.3

Attitude Dynamics
The replicator dynamics is traditionally used to describe the evolution of the

distributions of large populations. However, it can also be used as a deliberation
process [24] where each player updates its mixed strategy according to the mixed
strategy of the other player. Here, we interpret x(t) and y(t) as the mixed strategies
of player 1 and player 2. Each player updates its mixed strategy according to (4.13)
and (4.14).
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To extend the dynamics to the satisficing case, we operate the replicator dynamics on the players’ attitudes rather than on the strategies they implement. Define
the vectors c(t) ∈ ∆a1 and d(t) ∈ ∆a2 , which define the mixed attitudes for each player
at time t. We require that both players have finite attitude spaces so that c(t) and
d(t) are finite-dimensional. The dynamics allows the players to alter the probability with which they will exhibit the attitudes in their attitude spaces. The attitude
dynamics is given by (4.13) and (4.14), except that we consider the expected utility
of the attitudes rather than the strategy profiles. Thus, as long as all attitudes are
represented in the initial conditions, any steady state of the dynamics is an attitude
equilibrium.
To apply the attitude dynamics to the Ultimatum game, we first quantize the
players’ attitude spaces. Each player’s attitude space is A1 = A2 = {a1 , a2 , . . . , a100 },
a set of 100 evenly spaced values on the interval [0, 1]. Although this provides a finite
state space for the attitude dynamics, the high dimensionality and nonlinearity of the
system of differential equations makes analysis difficult. However, we can make a few
general statements about the results of the attitude dynamics.
We know that, given well-behaved initial conditions, the steady state of the
dynamics is an attitude equilibrium in either pure or mixed attitudes. The pureattitude equilibria are straightforward and have already been shown in Figure 4.1.
While the mixed-strategy equilibria are more complicated, we still can extract a few
simple and useful facts without overly complicated analysis. First, it is immediate that
any attitude profile with all of its probability within one of the equilibrium regions
of Figure 4.1 is itself an equilibrium. We cannot rule out, however, the possibility of
probability mass located in the non-equilibrium portions of the (Low, Accept) and
(High, Accept) regions. Fortunately, an attitude equilibrium cannot have probability
mass in either the (Low, Reject) or (High, Reject) regions. If there is probability
mass in those regions, each player can improve expected utility by modifying its
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mixed attitudes until there is no probability of rejecting the fraction. Therefore, the
attitude dynamics are guaranteed to eliminate the dysfunctional behavior observed
in Chapter 3.
To illustrate the behavior of the attitude dynamics, we study the dynamics
of the Ultimatum game under two different scenarios by numerically approximating
the solution to the differential equations defined by (4.13) and (4.14). For each
player’s initial conditions, we use a two-sided exponential distribution similar to the
Laplace distribution. Unlike the Laplace distribution, however, the two sides are not
symmetric. That is, the initial conditions are given by

ci (0) =




Ceλ1 (ai −µ) , for ai ≤ µ

,

(4.15)



Ceλ2 (µ−ai ) , for ai > µ

where λ1 and λ2 are chosen such that the expected value of the distribution is µ
and the variance is an arbitrary σ 2 , and C ensures normalization. This choice of
distribution provides several benefits in the attitude dynamics. First, we can define
an arbitrarily “tight” distribution around the player’s desired initial attitudes while
still giving nonzero probability to each element in the player’s attitude space, ensuring
that the steady-state of the dynamics is an attitude equilibrium.
The exponential distribution also encourages players’ distributions to “shift”
to adjacent values rather than “jump” across the pure-attitude set. Equations (4.13)
and (4.14) show that the probabilities grow not only according to their relative utility,
but also their current values. Therefore, this distribution ensures that attitudes close
to the initial mean can grow more readily than those far away. This allows for a
smoother and perhaps more realistic transition in the players’ attitudes.
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4.3.1

The “Arms Race”
In our simulations we let l = 0.25 and h = 0.75 be the low and high fractions

offered. In this first scenario, we initialize the players’ attitudes with means µ1 =
µ2 = 0.2 and variances σ12 = σ22 = 0.001. Initially, the players’ attitudes almost
invariably lead to the offer and acceptance of the high fraction. While such behavior
is not necessarily incoherent, their attitudes are not in equilibrium. The dynamics of
this scenario provides a useful demonstration of the social Nash equilibrium as well
as a highly interesting steady state.
Figure 4.2 shows the initial joint distribution of the player’s attitudes. Since
the player’s mixed attitudes are probabilistically independent, the joint distribution is
the product of the marginal distributions. Treating c(t) and d(t) as column vectors,
we express the joint distribution as the matrix J(t) = c(t)dT (t). Since the responder
initially earns maximal payoff, it has no incentive to shift its attitudes. The proposer,
however, can improve its payoff by increasing τ . In Figure 4.3, we see that the proposer shifts its attitudes such that the joint distribution peaks right on the boundary
between the (Low, Accept) and (High, Accept) regions of the satisficing rectangle.
The proposer has shifted its attitudes just enough move the players into the region
where it obtains maximum payoff.
Once the shift is made, however, the responder stands to gain by modifying its
preferences. In Figure 4.4, we see the results of an “arms race”: the responder slightly
increases δ to move the players to the (High, Accept) region, prompting the proposer
to increase τ . The players “walk” their attitudes along the High/Low boundary
until they intersect the Accept/Reject boundary. At this point (Figure 4.5), neither
player can improve payoff by changing attitudes, and the distribution becomes almost
entirely focused on the boundary point between the four regions. In this case, the
specific behavior is an artifact of the quantization of the attitude spaces, and the
players end up in the (High, Accept) region preferred by the responder.
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Figure 4.2: “Arms race” joint probability distribution: t = 0.

Figure 4.3: “Arms race” joint probability distribution: t = 35.
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Figure 4.4: “Arms race” joint probability distribution: t = 60.

Figure 4.5: “Arms race” joint probability distribution: t = 125.
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4.3.2

Overcoming Dysfunction
Consider the dysfunctional pair whose initial conditions are characterized by

µ1 = 0.8, µ2 = 0.9 and σ12 = σ22 = 0.001 (Figure 4.6). Here, the responder rejects
the high offer. The dynamics shifts both of the players’ attitudes toward an attitude
equilibrium, but which one? The proposer, of course, would prefer to end up in the
(Low, Accept) region, while the responder prefers (High, Accept). The answer lies
with which one adapts most quickly. Given the these initial conditions, the responder
is able to shift its attitudes to a different region more quickly than the proposer. The
responder begins accepting the low offer, and the proposer no longer has any reason
to adjust its attitudes, resulting in (Low, Accept) as the steady state behavior (Figure
4.7). Interestingly, in the Ultimatum game, the player who adapts first ends up in
its second-best region of the satisficing rectangle. Here, when the responder adapts
most quickly, the players end up choosing (Low, Accept), which is preferred by the
proposer. If we were to specify initial conditions in which the proposer were able to
adapt more quickly, the players would eventually end up in (High, Accept), which
is preferred by the responder. In either case, however, the dysfunctional behavior is
overcome and the players choose a strategy profile that results in non-zero payoff to
both players.
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Figure 4.6: “Dysfunctional” joint probability distribution: t = 0.

Figure 4.7: “Dysfunctional” joint probability distribution: t = 100.
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Chapter 5
Social Utilities in Non-cooperative Games
Here we present a more explicit combination of satisficing and non-cooperative
game theory. We apply the conditional structure of social utilities to an otherwise standard non-cooperative game-theoretic model. Players possess a single utility, which they may express conditionally, as in satisficing theory. However, each
player’s utility is defined over the entire pure-strategy space rather than only their
own pure-strategy sets. As in satisficing theory, we marginalize the utilities, but now
we may apply non-cooperative solutions concepts such as the Nash equilibrium to
the marginal utilities. After detailing this framework mathematically, we construct a
simple conditional-utility model for the Ultimatum game, showing that by adjusting
the players’ attitudes we modify the game’s subgame perfect equilibrium.
5.1

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory
First, we familiarize the reader with the theory of von Neumann-Morgenstern

utility functions [25]. As usual, we define a set of players I = {1, 2, . . . , n} who
must implement pure-strategy profiles s in the pure-strategy space S = ×ni=1 Si . Let
Θ be the mixed-strategy space, or the space of all probability distributions over S.
However, instead of defining the utilities directly, we first endow each player with
ordinal preferences over the mixed-strategy space.
The ordinal preferences are expressed as a total ordering i to player i of the
mixed-strategy profiles in Θ. For x, y ∈ Θ and i ∈ I, let x i y signify that x
is at least as preferred to y by player i, and let x ∼i y signify that x is considered
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equivalent to y by player i. Since the preferences specify a total ordering, the following
properties must be satisfied for all x, y, z ∈ Θ and i ∈ I:
1. Reflexivity: x i x
2. Antisymmetry: x i y and y i x ⇒ x ∼i y.
3. Transitivity: x i y and y i z ⇒ x i z.
4. Completeness: Either x i y or y i x.
With a total ordering across Θ, players can compare any two mixed-strategy profile
in terms of their ordinal preferences.
Definition 5.1 A von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is a function πi (s) defined over
S whose expected value is consistent with the preference ordering i :
ui (x) ≥ ui (y) ⇔ x i y, ∀x, y ∈ Θ,

(5.1)

where ui (x) denotes the expected value of πi using the mixed-strategy profile x as
defined in (2.5).
In other words, a probability distribution is preferred to another if and only if the
expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is greater under the first distribution
than it is under the second. In [26], existence conditions and properties for πi are
discussed in detail. For simplicity, we’ll assume that i is sufficiently well-behaved
that πi exists. To conclude our discussion, we note one important property of the
utilities.
Theorem 5.1 Let πi be a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility defined over S. Let πi′
be a positive affine transformation of πi ; that is, πi′ = aπi + b, where a is positive and
b is an arbitrary constant. Then πi′ is also a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility over
S.
Proof: This is shown by the linearity of expectation. Given x ∈ Θ, We can write
the expectation of πi′ as
u′i (x) = aui (x) + b.
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Let y and z be two mixed-strategy profiles in Θ. Since a is positive and b is simply
a constant, u′i (y) ≥ u′i (z) if and only if ui (y) ≥ ui (z). Since πi is a von NeumannMorgenstern utility, this is true if and only if y i z. Thus, u′i (y) ≥ u′i (z) if and only
if y i z, making πi′ a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
We can show by counterexample that a transformation that is not positive affine will,
in general, violate i . In fact, even a monotonic transformation—where the ordering
on pure-strategy profiles is preserved—will, in general, violate the preference ordering
i unless it is a positive affine transformation.
5.2
5.2.1

Social Utilities
Commitment and Conditional Utilities
As with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, we build the conditional util-

ities from the “ground up,” defining preference orderings from which the utilities are
derived. We begin by defining a player’s commitment to a pure-strategy profile, which
was introduced in a slightly different context in [27].
Definition 5.2 Player i is committed to the pure-strategy profile s ∈ S if
s ≻i r, ∀r 6= s
and
r ∼i q, ∀r, q 6= s.
In other words, player i is committed to s if s is most the most preferred strategy profile and if every other pure-strategy profile is equally inferior. If player i is committed
to si , it is the only pure-strategy profile worthy of consideration.
In our model the players’ utilities are based upon total preference orderings
over Θ. However, the players’ preference orderings are conditional upon the commitments of the other players. That is, player i specifies a total preference ordering
over the mixed-strategy space given that each of the other players are committed to
pure-strategy profiles. Let x i|s1 ···si−1 si+1 ···sn y signify that the mixed-strategy profile
x is at least preferred to y to player i given that player 1 is committed to s1 , player
47

2 is committed to s2 , and so on. For convenience, we will use the notation s−i to
refer to the collection of pure-strategy profiles to which the other n − 1 players commit, allowing us to denote the conditional ordering as i|s−i . We stress that these
preference orderings are conditioned on a hypothetical commitment. The players do
not need to be committed to the pure-strategy profiles in s−i for player i to define its
conditional preferences. Instead, if the players were committed to the pure-strategy
profiles specified, player i’s preference ordering over Θ would be i|s−i . Player i’s
conditional ordering must be defined for each of the |S|n−1 different combinations
of pure-strategy profiles to which the other players may commit. These conditional
orderings allow us to define conditional utilities:
Definition 5.3 A conditional utility is a function πi|−i (s|s−i ) defined over S n which
satisfies the following properties:
1. Consistency: ui|−i (x|s−i ) ≥ ui|−i (y|s−i ) ⇔ x i|s−i y, ∀x, y ∈ Θ, s−i ∈ S n−1 .
P
n−1
2. Normalization:
.
s∈S πi|−i (s|s−i ) = 1, ∀s−i ∈ S

3. Nonnegativity: πi|−i (s|s−i ) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, s−i ∈ S n−1 .

4. Uniqueness: mins∈S πi|−i (s|s−i ) = 0 unless πi|−i (s|s−i ) = πi|−i (s′ |s−i ), ∀s′ ∈ S.
For each s−i ∈ S n−1 to which the remaining players commit, πi|−i (si |s−i ) is a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility over the ordering i|s−i . We additionally
impose the normalization and nonnegativity constraints, making the conditional utilities syntactically equivalent to a conditional probability mass function. By forcing
the minimum value to zero, we define a unique normalized utility consistent with
i|s−i . Since von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities are unique only up to a positive
affine transformation, we simply select the transformation that results in a normalized, nonnegative utility where the minimum is zero.
A player’s conditional utility does not necessarily depend on the commitments
of all of the remaining players; it may depend on a subset of the remaining players’
commitments or upon none at all.
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Definition 5.4 Player i’s conditional utility is preferentially independent of player
j’s commitment if
πi|−ij,j (s|s−ij , sj ) = πi|−ij,j (s|s−ij , s′j ), ∀s′j ∈ S,
or, equivalently
i|s−ij ,sj =i|s−ij ,s′j , ∀s′j ∈ S,
where s−ij ∈ S n−2 is the collection of pure-strategy profiles to which all the players
except for i and j commit. Player i’s conditional preference ordering—and therefore
the conditional utility—does not change with the commitment of player j.
Note that preferential independence1 is a one-way relationship. That is, player i’s
independence to player j’s commitment does not imply that player j’s utilities are
independent of player i’s commitment. Player j may still condition its utilities on
player i’s commitment. If player i’s utilities are independent of the all of the other
players, then we can write its conditional utility and preference ordering as πi and
i , respectively.
While we regard the players’ commitments as hypothetical in terms of the
conditional utility functions, a player may actually commit to a pure-strategy profile.
If player i commits to the pure-strategy profile s∗ , then by the definition of commitment, player i’s utility is preferentially independent of the remaining players, and all
of player i’s utility is placed on s∗ , or

πi (s) =

5.2.2

Marginal Utilities




1, if s = s∗

.



0, otherwise

The conditional utilities express player i’s utility given hypothetical commitments to pure-strategy profiles by the remaining players, prompting an obvious ques1

Preferential independence should not be confused with the familiar notion of “statistical” independence from probability theory. If two players’ utilities are statistically independent, then the
joint utility is the product of marginal utilities, or πij (si , sj ) = πi (si )πj (sj ). While the preferential dependency relationships between players do determine whether their utilities are statistically
independent, preferential independence does not necessarily imply statistical independence.
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tion: what are player i’s actual utilities? That is, from the conditional utilities, how
do we extract a utility πi (s), defined over S, for each player?
The conditional utilities conform to the mathematical syntax of conditional
probability mass functions. As in Chapter 3, we may appeal to the argument given in
[21], which states that we must use the rules of probability theory in order to satisfy
several desirable axioms. From the conditional utility πi|−i , we can form a utility over
S by summing over S n−1 :

πi (si ) =

X

s−i

πi|−i (si |s−i )π−i (s−i ),

(5.2)

∈S n−1

where π−i (s−i ) is the joint utility of the other players. The specification for π−i (s−i )
depends on the preferential dependency relationships between the players’ utilities,
which we will examine in more detail later. However, this joint utility is a mass
function and thus is nonnegative and sums to unity.
As with satisficing theory, and by analogy with probability theory, we refer to
πi as player i’s marginal utility. Equation (5.2) defines πi as a convex combination
of the conditional utilities defined by πi|−i . Player i specifies its hypothetical utilities
by πi|−i for each of the possible combinations of pure-strategy profiles in S n−1 . We
then form a weighted sum of each of those hypothetical utilities, where the weighting
is determined by the joint utility π−i .
The joint utilities π−i (s−i ), which are used to compute each player’s marginal
utility, depend on the dependency relationships between the players’ utilities. These
relationships greatly impact whether or not we can extract a unique marginal utility
from the conditionals. As we will see, there are dependency relationships for which we
cannot solve for unique marginal utilities defined by the conditional utilities. As with
the conditional relationships in satisficing theory, we may express the relationships
between the utilities graphically.
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Definition 5.5 A utility network is a directed (but not necessarily acyclic) graph
with n nodes and an arbitrary number of edges. The nodes represent the players’
marginal utilities, while the edges represent conditioning between players’ utilities.
Figure 5.1 shows two utility networks that are acyclic. In the utility network shown
in Figure 5.1(a), the first three players form their utilities independent of the others’
commitments, or πi|−i = πi , i = 1, 2, 3. Since they are mutally independent, the
joint utility of the first three players is simply the product of marginals, or π123 =
π1 π2 π3 . Player 4’s conditional utility, which depends on each of the remaining players’
commitments, is π4|123 . The marginal utility is given by

π4 (s4 ) =

X

π4|123 (s4 |s1 , s2 , s3 )π123 (s1 , s2 , s3 )

(5.3)

X

π4|123 (s4 |s1 , s2 , s3 )π1 (s1 )π2 (s2 )π3 (s3 ).

(5.4)

s1 ,s2 ,s3 ∈S

=

s1 ,s2 ,s3 ∈S
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Figure 5.1: Two acyclic utility networks.
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In Figure 5.1(b), players 1 and 3 form their utilities independently. Player 2’s
conditional utility depends on player 1’s commitments, and the marginal utility is

π2 (s2 ) =

X

π2|1 (s2 |s1 )π1 (s1 ).

(5.5)

s1 ∈S

While player 4’s conditional utility only explicitly depends on the commitments of
players 2 and 3, there is an indirect dependency on player 1’s utilities, as seen in the
marginal utility:

π4 (s4 ) =

X

π4|23 (s4 |s2 , s3 )π23 (s2 , s3 )

(5.6)

X

π4|23 (s4 |s2 , s3 )π2 (s2 )π3 (s3 )

(5.7)

X

π4|23 (s4 |s2 , s3 )

s2 ,s3 ∈S

=

s2 ,s3 ∈S

=

s2 ,s3 ∈S

=

X

X

π2|1 (s2 |s1 )π1 (s1 )π3 (s3 )

(5.8)

s1 ∈S

π4|23 (s4 |s2 , s3 )π2|1 (s2 |s1 )π1 (s1 )π3 (s3 ).

(5.9)

s1 s2 ,s3 ∈S

In an acyclic graph, it is always possible to express the players’ marginal utilities
as a function only of the conditional utilities. So, in an acyclic graph, the marginal
utilities are always uniquely determined from the conditional utilities.
Figure 5.2 shows a cyclic utility network with two players. In this network,
the players’ conditional utilities are functions of each other’s commitments, meaning
that neither of the players expresses its marginal utility directly. To appreciate the
difficulty associated with such a network, consider the marginal utility of player 1,
which is given by
π1 (s1 ) =

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 ).

s2 ∈S
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(5.10)

However, π2 is expressed in terms of π1 :

π2 (s2 ) =

X

π2|1 (s2 |s1 )π1 (s1 ).

(5.11)

s1 ∈S

89:;
?>=<
1 o

?>=<
/ 89:;
2

Figure 5.2: Two-player cyclic utility network.

We might wonder whether or not a solution to the coupled equations exists,
and whether or not it is unique. Fortunately, the analysis is fairly straightforward if
we convert (5.10) and (5.11) to matrix-vector equations. We express the conditional
utilities as the |S|×|S| matrices Π1|2 and Π2|1 . Each column of the matrices represents
the conditional utility for a different pure-strategy commitment. The matrices are
therefore column stochastic, meaning that each column is nonnegative sums to unity.
We express the marginal utilities as |S|-dimensional column stochastic vectors π 1 and
π 2 . We can now rewrite (5.10) and (5.11) as

π 1 = Π1|2 π 2 ,

(5.12)

π 2 = Π2|1 π 1 .

(5.13)

Substituting the equations into each other yields

π 1 = Π1|2 Π2|1 π 1 ,

(5.14)

π 2 = Π2|1 Π1|2 π 2 .

(5.15)

Now we have transformed the problem into an eigenvector problem. If λ = 1 is an
eigenvalue for the matrices Π1|2 Π2|1 and Π2|1 Π1|2 , then there exists a solution to the
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equations. If there is a unique linearly independent eigenvector associated with λ = 1
for these matrices, the solution is unique.
First, we discuss existence. Note that the product of two column stochastic
matrices is also column stochastic. From Perron-Frobenius theory [28], we know that
every column stochastic matrix has the eigenvalue λ = 1. Therefore, there must exist
marginal utilities that satisfy (5.14) and (5.15). However, there is no guarantee that
a unique solution exists. To see this, let Π1|2 = Π2|1 = I, the identity matrix. Since
all of the relevant matrices are the identity, any stochastic vector satisfies (5.14) and
(5.15) so long as we choose π 1 = π 2 . Here, the conditional utility functions do not
uniquely specify the players’ marginal utilities.
A closer look at the conditional utilities provides an intuitive explanation.
Each player’s conditional utility is the identity matrix. Such a conditional utility
is an expression of complete indifference: each player has decided that its marginal
utility will simply be the other player’s utility. Since neither player expresses any
meaningful preferences, we cannot solve for unique marginal utilities. In general,
when the conditional utilities do not yield unique marginal utilities, we say that the
marginal utilities do not exist, even though technically there may be an infinity of
marginal utilities consistent with the conditional utilities.
Finally, we examine the effect of commitment on the marginal utilities. If
every player except for player i commits to a pure-strategy profile, their utilities are
preferentially independent, and all of the utility is placed on the pure-strategy profile
to which they commit. Letting s∗−i denote the |S| − 1 pure-strategy profiles to which
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the players commit, the joint utility is

π−i (s−i ) =

Y

πj (s∗j )

(5.16)

j6=i

=




1, if s−i = s∗−i

.

(5.17)



0, otherwise

Therefore, the marginal utility for player i is

πi (si ) =

X

s−i

πi|−i (si |s−i )π−i (s−i )

(5.18)

∈S n−1

= πi|−i (si |s∗−i ).

(5.19)

If players commit to pure-strategy profiles, then the resulting marginal utilities are
simply the conditional utilities evaluated at the pure-strategy profiles to which the
players commit.
5.2.3

Marginal Preferences
We have defined the marginal utility entirely in terms of the conditional and

joint utilities rather than in terms of a total preference ordering. That is, we have
not specified a “marginal” ordering i that is derived directly from i|s−i . However,
when a unique marginal utility πi exists, it does induce a total preference ordering
over the mixed-strategy space:

x i y ⇔ ui (x) ≥ ui (y).

Fortunately, we have defined the conditional utilities such that there is a unique conditional utility for every conditional ordering i|s−i . Therefore, when unique marginal
utilities exist, the conditional preferences define unique marginal preference orderings
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i . This gives justification to the fourth property in Definition 5.3, where we required
a unique normalization on the conditional utilities. In the next theorem, we show that
without a unique normalization, there is not, in general, a unique preference ordering
i defined by the conditional orderings i|s−i .
Theorem 5.2 A unique normalization of the conditional utilities guarantees a unique
preference ordering i to result from the conditional preferences i|s−i , ∀i ∈ I. Moreover, a unique normalization is a necessary condition for the existence of a unique
preference ordering in the following sense: if we remove the uniqueness property from
the definition of a conditional utility, the conditional preferences no longer, in general,
specify unique marginal preference orderings.
Proof: Sufficiency follows directly from the uniqueness of the conditional utilities.
For necessity, note that by removing the requirement of unique normalization, we
can apply a positive affine transformation to the conditional utilities as long as it
preserves the normalization and nonnegativity constraints. For a conditional utility
′
πi|−i , such a transformation is of the form πi|−i
= aπi|−i + b such that
− min πi|−i (si |s−i ) ≤ b < |S|−1
si ∈S

and
a = 1 − b |S| .
′
The choice of a and b ensure that πi|−i
still meets the nonnegativity and normalization
criteria of a conditional mass function.
Next, consider a simple example where there are only two players. Player
1’s conditional utility depends on the pure-strategy profile to which player 2 (hypothetically) commits, while player 2’s conditional utility is independent of player
1. Player 2’s conditional utility is therefore equivalent to its marginal utility, or
π2|1 (s2 |s1 ) = π2 (s2 ). Denote the two conditional preference orderings 1|s2 and 2 .
Player 1’s marginal utility is given by
X
π1 (s1 ) =
π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 ).
(5.20)
s2 ∈S

Define 1 as the preference ordering induced by the marginal utility π1 .
Now, define π2′ , a positive affine transformation of π2 that preserves normalization and nonnegativity as discussed. Since it is an affine transformation, π2′ is still
consistent with the preference ordering 2 . Player 1’s marginal utility using π2′ is
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now
π1′ (s1 ) =

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2′ (s2 )

(5.21)

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )(aπ2 (s2 ) + b)

(5.22)

s2 ∈S

=

X

s2 ∈S

=a

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 ) + b

s2 ∈S

= aπ1 (s1 ) + b

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )

(5.23)

s2 ∈S

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 ).

(5.24)

s2 ∈S

Define ′1 as the preference ordering induced by the new marginal utility π1′ . Since
in (5.24) we sum over s2 , the second term is not generally constant with respect to
s1 . Therefore, π1′ is not a positive affine transformation of π1 and is not in general
consistent with the original preference ordering 1 . Thus, in general, 1 6=′1 . Since
positive affine transformations in the conditional utilities result in different marginal
preference orderings, a unique normalization on the conditionals is required to ensure
a unique marginal preference ordering.
5.3

The Ultimatum Game
In this section we frame the Ultimatum Game as a non-cooperative game with

social utilities. We again employ the simple quantized game presented in [15], where
the proposer offers a high or low fraction and the responder accepts or rejects the
offer. For convenience, we abbreviate the notation used by denoting the proposer’s
pure-strategy set as S1 = {H, L} and the responder’s as S2 = {A, R}. As in previous
chapters, we denote the numerical value of the high and low fractions as h and l,
respectively, with h > l.
We model the players with a cyclic two-player utility network—each player’s
conditional utility depends on the commitment of the other player. Because of this, we
will directly express the players’ utilities in the matrix-vector form shown in Section
5.2.2. We assume a sociological model similar to that of the satisficing case presented
in [19], where the proposer’s only social consideration is fear that the responder might
reject a low offer, and the responder’s only social consideration is indignation over
being offered an unfair fraction.
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5.3.1

Conditional Utilities
We begin by defining the proposer’s conditional utilities. Since each player

chooses between two pure strategies, the pure-strategy space contains four purestrategy profiles. We express the proposer’s conditional utilities with the 4 × 4 matrix
Π1|2 , which has the form


Π1|2

π1|2 (H, A|H, A)

 π1|2 (L, A|H, A)

=
π (H, R|H, A)
 1|2

π1|2 (L, R|H, A)


π1|2 (H, A|L, A) π1|2 (H, A|H, R) π1|2 (H, A|L, R)

π1|2 (L, A|L, A) π1|2 (L, A|H, R) π1|2 (L, A|L, R) 

.
π1|2 (H, R|L, A) π1|2 (H, R|H, R) π1|2 (H, R|L, R)


π1|2 (L, R|L, A) π1|2 (L, R|H, R) π1|2 (L, R|L, R)

The first column describes the proposer’s utility given that the responder commits
to s2 = (H, A), the second column describes the proposer’s utility given that the
responder is committed to s2 = (L, A), and so forth.
Since the proposer’s only social consideration is that the responder might reject
the low offer, the proposer has no need to modify its utility if the responder commits
to a pure-strategy profile in which the offer is accepted. Given these commitments,
the proposer’s conditional utility is simply the normalized payoffs from the payoff
matrix in Table 2.5. This specifies the first two columns of Π1|2 :









 π1|2 (H, A|H, A)  π1|2 (H, A|L, A)
1 − h

 



 π1|2 (L, A|H, A)   π1|2 (L, A|L, A) 
1 − l
1

 




=

.
=
π (H, R|(H, A) 



2
−
l
−
h
 1|2
 π1|2 (H, R|L, A)
 0 

 



π1|2 (L, R|(H, A)
0
π1|2 (L, R|L, A)


If, however, the responder commits to a strategy profile in which the offer is
rejected, the proposer tempers its desire for payoff by the temperance index2 0 ≤ τ ≤
2

The intuition behind the temperance index is identical to the intemperance index from the
satisficing model, except that we reverse the direction: the higher the temperance index, the more
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1. If τ = 0, the proposer ignores the responder’s preferences and the possibility that
it might reject the offer. If τ = 1, the proposer completely defers to the responder’s
preferences and gives maximal utility to (h, a). In either case, the proposer assigns
zero utility to having the offer rejected. This gives us the third and fourth columns
of Π1|2 :







π1|2 (H, A|H, R) π1|2 (H, A|L, R)
(1 − τ )(1 − h) + τ (2 − l − h)

 




 π1|2 (L, A|H, R)   π1|2 (L, A|L, R) 

(1
−
τ
)(1
−
l)
1

 



=
=
.



π (H, R|H, R) π (H, R|L, R) 2 − l − h 
0

  1|2

 1|2


 



π1|2 (L, R|L, R)
π1|2 (L, R|H, R)
0




Now we can write player 1’s conditional utilities as a single matrix:

Π1|2



1 − h 1 − h (1−τ )(1−h) + τ (2−l−h) (1−τ )(1−h) + τ (2−l−h)



 1−l 1−l
(1−τ
)(1−l)
(1−τ
)(1−l)
1


=
.


2−l−h  0
0
0
0




0
0
0
0
Next we define the responder’s conditional utilities. The only social consid-

eration facing the responder is a desire to punish the proposer for his offering an
unfair fraction. Therefore, if the proposer commits to a strategy profile in which the
high fraction is offered, the responder’s utilities come directly from the payoff matrix,
giving us columns 1 and 3 of Π2|1 :








 
π (H, A|H, R)
π2|1 (H, A|H, A)  2|1
h

 

 
 π2|1 (L, A|H, A)   π2|1 (L, A|H, R) 
l
1

 

 
=
=

 

 .
π (H, R|H, A) π (H, R|H, R) l + h  

  2|1
 2|1
0

 

 
π2|1 (L, R|H, R)
π2|1 (L, R|H, A)
0

the proposer is willing to accommodate the responder. While this reversal may be slightly confusing,
it ensures that if the responder sets τ = 0, its utilities revert to the payoffs from the payoff matrix.
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If the proposer commits to a pure-strategy profile in which the low fraction is offered,
the responder increasingly prefers to punish the responder by rejecting the offer. We
model this with the indignation index 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, which describes the responder’s
response to being offered the low fraction. As δ approaches 1, the responder is increasingly willing to forfeit the low fraction, and places all of the utility on rejecting
the low fraction:








π (H, A|L, R)
π2|1 (H, A|L, A)  2|1
h(1 − δ)

 



 π2|1 (L, A|L, A)   π2|1 (L, A|L, R) 
 l(1 − δ) 
1

 



=
=
.



π (H, R|L, A) π (H, R|L, R) l + h 
0

  2|1

 2|1


 



π2|1 (L, R|L, R)
π2|1 (L, R|L, A)
δ(l + h)


Combining these columns into the full matrix, we get

Π2|1


h h(1 − δ)

1 
 l l(1 − δ)
=

l + h 0
0


0 δ(l + h)

h
l
0
0


h(1 − δ)

l(1 − δ) 

.

0


δ(l + h)

Note that for both players, the conditional utilities reduce to normalized versions of
the payoff matrix—and are independent of the commitment of the other player—if
social considerations are ignored (τ = 0 or δ = 0).
5.3.2

Marginal Utilities
As in the two-player example from Section 5.2.2, we set up two eigenvector

equations to compute the marginal utilities:

π 1 = Π1|2 Π2|1 π 1 ,
π 2 = Π2|1 Π1|2 π 2 .
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To find the solution for the marginal π 1 , we consider the eigen-decomposition of
Π1|2 Π2|1 . Since the analysis is tedious and not terribly enlightening, we relegate
the details to Appendix B. Fortunately, the eigen-decomposition yields a unique,
normalized eigenvector for λ = 1, which is the solution for the marginal π 1 :



π
(H,
A)
(1
−
h)
+
τ
δ(1
−
l)


 1






 π1 (L, A) 

1−l
1




π1 = 
=
.


π (H, R) 2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l) 
0


 1





π1 (L, R)
0


This result is gratifyingly intuitive. If either player ignores social considerations (τ = 0
or δ = 0), player 1’s utilities revert to the (normalized) raw payoffs. Otherwise, the
relative utility for s1 = (H, A) increases according to the product τ δ(1 − l). Setting
(1 − h) + τ δ(1 − l) = 1 − l, we can show that player 1 is indifferent between the
strategy profiles (H, A) and (L, A) when

τ=

h−l
.
δ(1 − l)

When τ is greater than this quantity, player 1 prefers (H, A) to (L, A), even though
it results in lower raw payoff.
To find player 2’s marginal utilities, we consider the eigen-decomposition of
Π1|2 Π2|1 , which also yields a unique vector for λ = 1:




π2 (H, A)
h(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1))




 π2 (L, A) 
 l(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1)) 
1




π2 = 

=
.
π (H, R) (l + h)(2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)) 

0
 2







π2 (L, R)
δ(l + h)(1 − l)
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Although player 2’s utility is more complicated, we still can glean an intuition from
its form. We see that if δ = 0, the utilities are those from the payoff matrix. Notice,
however, that player 2’s utilities are not simply those from the payoff matrix when
τ = 0. Regardless of τ , player 2 assigns nonzero utility to s2 = (L, R) as long as
player 1 has nonzero utility for (L, A). When

δ=

h(2 − h − l)
,
(h(2 − τ ) + l)(1 − l)

player 2 is indifferent between (L, A) and (L, R). When δ exceeds this equality, player
2 prefers (L, R) to (L, A). In fact, it is even possible, for sufficiently high δ, for (L, R)
to be the most preferred strategy profile, preferred even to (H, A)! This, however,
does not affect the Nash equilibria that result, as we shall see in the next subsection.
5.3.3

Equilibria
To examine the equilibria of the Ultimatum game using social utilities, we take

the marginal utilities from π 1 and π 2 and arrange them into a game tree. While the
exact utilities depend on l, h, δ, and τ , the game will always have the form given in
Figure 5.3, where
(1 − h) + τ δ(1 − l)
,
2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)
h(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1)
β=
,
(l + h)(2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)
l(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1)
γ=
,
(l + h)(2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)
δ(l + h)(1 − l)
.
ω=
(l + h)(2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)
α=

(5.25)
(5.26)
(5.27)
(5.28)

For convenience, we also display the normal-form representation in the payoff matrix
of Table 5.1.
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1
H

L

2
A
α, β

2
R

A

0, 0

1 − α, γ

R
0, ω

Figure 5.3: Game tree for the Ultimatum game with social utilities.
Table 5.1: Payoff matrix for the Ultimatum game with social utilities.

Proposer
H
L

(A, A)
(α, β)
(1 − α, γ)

Responder
(A, R)
(R, A)
(α, β)
(0, 0)
(0, ω) (1 − α, γ)

(R, R)
(0, 0)
(0, ω)

Depending on the parameters, there are four possible cases. When α < 1/2 and
ω < γ, there are two3 pure-strategy equilibria: s = (L, A) and s = (H, A). However,
s = (H, A) is an equilibrium only if the responder plays (A, R) and threatens to reject
the low fraction. This strategy is not a credible threat since ω < γ and the responder
prefers to accept (rather than reject) the low fraction. The unique subgame perfect
equilibrium is therefore s = (L, A).
Next, we consider α > 1/2 and ω < γ. Now the proposer prefers to offer the
high fraction. Again, the Nash equilibria are s = (L, A) and s = (H, A). However, in
this case the s = (L, A) occurs only when the responder threatens to reject the high
fraction, which is not credible. Therefore, we are left with s = (H, A) as the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
In the third case, α < 1/2 and ω > γ. Now, the responder prefers to reject
the low offer rather than accept it. The two equilibria are s = (H, A) and s = (L, R).
3

Just as in Section 2.2.1, we abuse notation by denoting the eventual actions played out rather
than the full strategy of the responder, which is expressed as a function of the proposer’s move. In
this sense, there are more than two equilibria for these cases, but multiple equilibria result in the
same eventual actions.
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However, since the s = (L, R) equilibrium results when the responder threatens to
reject the high fraction, only s = (H, A) is subgame perfect.
The final case, where α > 1/2 and ω > γ, has nearly the same analysis. Even
though the proposer now prefers to offer the high fraction, the equilibria are still
s = (H, A) and s = (L, R). Again, the s = (L, R) results only when the responder
threatens to reject the high fraction, so only s = (H, A) is subgame perfect.

1

(H, A), (L, A)

0.9

h = 0.5, l = 0.15
h = 0.5, l = 0.25
h = 0.5, l = 0.35

0.8
0.7

(H, A), (L, R)

τ

0.6

(L, A), (H, A)

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2

(H, A), (L, R)

0.1
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

δ
Figure 5.4: Ultimatum game equilibria. Subgame perfect equilibria are bold.

Since the game is played sequentially, the subgame perfect equilibrium depends more on δ than on τ . If the responder’s indignation is sufficiently high that
(L, R) is preferred to (H, A), then it can credibly threaten to reject the low fraction,
and the proposer must offer the high fraction to obtain any payoff. Thus, by changing
δ, the responder can force the overall outcome to (H, A). Such reasoning leads us to
consider evolutionary games in the attitudes τ and δ similar to the indirect evolu64

tionary dynamics discussed in [29, 30] or the attitude dynamics presented in Chapter
4. However, we do not consider such games in this thesis.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1

Summary
We have sought to combine the merits of satisficing game theory with the more

traditional non-cooperative game theory. This effort was motivated by the fact that
satisficing players—while socially flexible due to the probabilistic structure of their
utilities—may behave incoherently because they consider the preferences of other
players, but not the strategies they play. We have presented two distinct methods of
accomplishing this task, both of which allow players to consider the actions of other
players. We have applied these to the Ultimatum game, which is problematic under
both the non-cooperative and satisficing frameworks.
In our first approach, we let the players’ attitudes to evolve according to
the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. This allows players to adapt
their attitudes in order to improve raw payoffs, adding a “layer” of self-interest to a
satisficing game. The attitude dynamics leads players toward a Nash equilibrium in
their attitudes—rather than in their actions—that we term an attitude equilibrium.
In the Ultimatum game, attitude equilibria exist where both the high fraction and
the low fraction are accepted. However, the solutions where the responder rejects the
offer—which were possible under the original satisficing formulation—are eliminated
by the attitude dynamics. Incoherent behaviors are eliminated, while social flexibility
is preserved.
Our second approach is to introduce conditional utilities directly into noncooperative games. We define conditional utilities over the entire pure-strategy space
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so that players’ marginal utilities may consider other players’ preferences as well as
the strategies they choose. We may then apply traditional non-cooperative solution
concepts to the marginal utilities such as the Nash equilibrium. We present a simple
social utility model for the Ultimatum game, finding that we can change the subgame
perfect equilibrium by adjusting the players’ attitudes, allowing subgame perfect equilibria where both the high and low fraction are accepted. It is also possible for the
rejection of the low fraction to be a Nash equilibrium, but this equilibrium is not
subgame perfect.
As with the attitude dynamics, we avoid incoherent behaviors while keeping
the flexibility of the conditional utilities. However, it is the author’s opinion that this
method is the superior approach to combining satisficing and non-cooperative game
theory. Instead of introducing a “patch” on the satisficing model by injecting selfinterest into of the existing structure, we embed the conditional structure directly into
players’ utilities. The blend of self-interest and consideration for others’ preferences
emerges naturally out of the structure of the utilities, and incoherent behaviors are
avoided naturally since we can use traditional solution concepts related to the Nash
equilibrium.
6.2

Further Research
This thesis leaves open several areas for future work, mostly related to the

use of social utilities in non-cooperative games. First is the problem of solving for
players’ marginal utilities in complicated utility networks. In a two-player network,
the cyclical nature of the conditional utilities leads to an eigenvector problem. If
a unique eigenvector exists for the eigenvalue λ = 1, we can solve analytically for
the players’ marginal utilities. However, for a fully-connected network of three or
more players—where each player’s utility depends on the commitments of every other
player—we cannot solve for the marginal utilities using a simple eigen-decomposition,

68

even if unique utilities exist. It may not even be possible to solve for the marginals
in closed form. Therefore, it may be fruitful to explore algorithms by which we may
solve iteratively for players’ marginal utilities and discover when unique marginals do
not exist.
We also have restricted our attention to games where players’ strategy sets
are finite. One could investigate the consequences of generalizing to the case of uncountable strategy sets. The utilities would then take the form of probability density
functions rather than mass functions. For acyclic networks, the extension seems
straightforward. However, for cyclic networks, even with only two players, continuous strategy sets prevent us from solving for the marginals using a matrix eigendecomposition. However, the conditional utilities may define an infinite-dimensional
operator which we may diagonalize to solve for the marginals. Failing this, we may
also apply numerical techniques to approximate the players’ marginal utilities.
Finally, we previously hinted at extending the conditional structure proposed
in Chapter 5 by playing evolutionary games in the player’s attitudes, allowing each
player to adjust their attitudes in an attempt to force the equilibrium it prefers. Such
an approach may provide a method for choosing players’ attitudes according to the
structure of the conditional utilities.
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Appendix A
Justifying the Probabilistic Structure
In this appendix we give an axiomatic justification for the conditional utility
structure used throughout this thesis, particularly the way in which we combine the
conditional utilities to extract a marginal utility. A similar justification has been
given by Stirling in several different contexts (see [21, 27]).
Our axiomatization bears resemblance to that given by Cox in [31, 32]. In
these publications, Cox intends to prove that the use of a standard probability measure1 is a necessary and sufficient condition to satisfy several seemingly natural and
intuitive axioms. However, Cox’s arguments are somewhat vaguely articulated, and
attempts to make Cox’s theorem rigorous have been problematic (see [33] for a detailed description of these difficulties).
Our approach is separate from that of Cox. We use a different set of axioms to
justify a somewhat weaker result. In our approach, we deal with functions which take
point-valued arguments (rather than measures defined on sets as in Cox’s treatment),
allowing us to avoid the issues raised regarding Cox’s result.
In this appendix, we use the conditional-utility notation used in Chapter 5,
although the result also applies to the probabilistic structure of satisficing game theory
given in Chapter 3. We extend our notation to deal with the utilities of sets of players.
For disjoint sets J, K ⊂ I, let πJK denote the joint utility of the players in J ∪ K, and
let πJ|K denote the joint utility of the players in J conditioned on the commitments
of the players in K.
1

Or, more precisely, the use of a measure isomorphic to a probability measure.
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Axiom 1 (Conditioning) Players may express their utilities conditionally as functions of the (hypothetical) commitments of other players.
This axiom simply posits the existence of conditional utilities of the form πJ|K .
Axiom 2 (Normalization) Any utility of the form πJ|K must be non-negative and
sum to unity; that is,
X
πJ|K (sj |sk ) = 1, ∀sk
(A.1)
sj

and
πJ|K (sj |sk ) ≥ 0, ∀sj , sk .

(A.2)

Normalization is a fairly mild constraint. As we saw in Chapter 5, any von NeumannMorgenstern utility can be transformed into a normalized utility via a positive affine
transformation. Further, normalization limits the interpersonal comparison of utilities
that results from the conditional utility structure. Normalized utilities are expressions of dimensionless relative benefit rather than utility on a personal—and therefore
arbitrary—scale.
Axiom 3 (Endogenous aggregation) For disjoint subsets J, K ⊂ I, the joint utility πJK is endogenously aggregated if there is some function F [·, ·], nondecreasing in
both arguments, such that
πJK = F [πJ|K , πK ] = F [πJ ′ |K ′ , πK ′ ],

(A.3)

where J ′ and K ′ are arbitrary disjoint subsets of I such that J ′ ∪ K ′ = J ∪ K.
The endogeny axiom ensures that the joint utilities (and, as we shall see, the resulting
marginals) are independent of the “framing” of the problem. For example, if we have
two players, where one player’s utility is conditioned on the commitments of the other,
the joint utility is π12 = F [π1|2 , π2 ]. However, endogeny ensures that we can frame
the problem differently—where player 2’s utility is conditioned on the commitment
of player 1—and get the same joint utility π12 = F [π2|1 , π1 ].
Theorem A.1 (The Aggregation Theorem) The joint utility πJK is endogenously
aggregated if and only if F [·, ·] is isomorphic to multiplication; that is, there is a bijection f such that, for any endogenous aggregation F [·, ·],
f (πJK ) = f (F [πJ|K , πK ]) = πJ|K πK .
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(A.4)

Proof: Sufficiency is established by setting F [x, y] = xy and requiring that the
utilities be non-negative. F [·, ·] is nondecreasing in both arguments, and since multiplication is associative, there exist utilities πK|J and πJ such that πK|J πJ = πJ|K πK .
To show necessity, let J, K, L be mutually disjoint subsets of I. Define the
utilities πJKL , πJ|KL , πJK|L , πJK , πJ|K , and πJ . If F [·, ·] is an endogenous aggregation
function, it must satisfy
πJKL = F [πJ|KL , πKL ] = F [πJK|L , πL ].

(A.5)

πKL = F [πK|L , πL ]

(A.6)

πJK|L = F [πJ|KL , πK|L ].

(A.7)

However, we also have
and
Substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.5) gives us




F πJ|KL , F [πK|L , πL ] = F F [πJ|KL , πK|L ], πL .

(A.8)

In terms of general arguments, we can rewrite (A.8) as

F [x, F (y, z)] = F [F (x, y), z] ,

(A.9)

which is the well-studied associativity equation. It is shown in [34] that the general
solution to (A.9) is isomorphic to multiplication: for any F [·, ·] satisfying (A.9), there
exists a bijection f such that
f [F (x, y)] = f (x)f (y).

(A.10)

If we choose F (x, y) = xy, f (·) is the identity function, giving us πJK = F [πJ|K , πK ] =
πJ|K πK . Again we require that the utilities be non-negative to make F (·, ·) nondecreasing in both arguments. Any other choice of F (·, ·) must be isomorphic to such
an aggregation.
Theorem A.1 gives at least partial justification for the use of πJK = πJ|K πK
(called the chain rule or the product rule in probability theory) in aggregating conditional utilities into a joint utility. The choice of the product rule, combined with the
other axioms, necessarily leads to the formation of marginal utilities by summing over
the joint utility. For players 1 and 2, summing over the joint utility of both players

77

gives
X

π12 (s1 , s2 ) =

s1 ∈S

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 )

(A.11)

s1 ∈S

= π2 (s2 )

X

π1|2 (s1 |s2 ).

(A.12)

s1 ∈S

Since the conditional utility π1|2 must sum to unity, we get the following expression
for the marginal utility π2 (s2 ):

π2 (s2 ) =

X

π12 (s1 , s2 ).

(A.13)

s1 ∈S

Since endogenous aggregation also allows us to partition π12 into the product of π1 (s1 )
and π2|1 (s2 |s1 ), we can also write player 1’s marginal utility as

π1 (s1 ) =

X

π12 (s1 , s2 ).

(A.14)

s2 ∈S

In our treatment, we have required that the joint utilities be formed by an
interchangeable aggregation function. If we define π12 = π1|2 π2 , there must also
exist utilities π2|1 and π1 such that π12 = π2|1 π1 . How are these “alternative” utilities
related to the original conditional utility formulation? By setting the two aggregations
equal to each other, we see that they are related by the familiar Bayes’ rule from
probability theory:

π2|1 (s2 |s1 )π1 (s1 ) = π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 ),

(A.15)

π1|2 (s1 |s2 )π2 (s2 )
.
π1 (s1 )

(A.16)

π2|1 (s2 |s1 ) =

The conditionals π2|1 and π1 encode the same dependency information as π1|2 and
π2 , and result in the same joint and marginal utilities. It is interesting to note that
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we can model the players two different ways—one in which player 1 conditions its
utility on player 2’s commitments, and one in which player 2 conditions its utility on
player 1’s commitments—and end up with identical joint and marginal utilities, and
therefore identical resulting behaviors.
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Appendix B
Marginal Utilities for the Ultimatum Game
First, we solve for the proposer’s marginal utilities, which must satisfy the
equation π 1 = Π1|2 Π2|1 π 1 . Our first step is to find the product Π1|2 Π2|1 , which is


Π1|2 Π2|1

1−h

 1−l
1

=

(2−l−h)(l+h)  0


0

(1−h)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))

1−h

(1−l)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))

1−l

0

0

0

0

(1−h)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))





(1−l)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l)) 

.

0


0
(B.1)

We already know that λ = 1 is an eigenvalue for this stochastic matrix. To find the
corresponding eigenvectors, we must solve the equation (Π1|2 Π2|1 − I)π 1 = 0:


1−h−(2−l−h)

 1−l



0


0

(1−h)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))

(1−h)

(1−l)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))−(2−l−h)

(1−l)

0

−(2−l−h)

0

0

  

(1−h)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l))
 π1,1  0
  

  

(1−l)(1−δ)+δ(1−h+τ (1−l)) 
 π1,2  0
 =  .

π  0

0
  1,3   
  

0
π1,4
−(2−l−h)
(B.2)

Fortunately, it’s clear that π1,3 = π1,4 = 0, leaving us with the system of equations

(1 − h − 2 + l + h)π1,1 + ((1 − h)(1 − δ) + δ(1 − h + τ (1 − l)))π1,2 = 0,

(B.3)

(1 − l)π1,1 + ((1 − l)(1 − δ) + δ(1 − l − τ (1 − l)) − 2 + l + h)π1,2 = 0.

(B.4)
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These two equations simplify to the single constraint

(1 − l)π1,1 = (1 − h + τ δ(1 − l))π1,2 .

(B.5)

This equation defines the family of eigenvectors for λ = 1. Fortunately, there is
only one linearly independent eigenvector, so unique marginal utilities exist. The
proposer’s marginal utility, which is the normalized eigenvector, is




1 − h + τ δ(1 − l)




1−l
1


π1 =

.

2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l) 
0




0
To find the responder’s marginal utilities, we could solve for the eigenvectors
of Π2|1 Π1|2 . However, it is much simpler and more direct to use the fact that π 2 =
Π2|1 π 1 . Since π 1 is now well-defined, we can evaluate the result:


h h(1 − δ)

1 
 l l(1 − δ)
π2 =

l + h 0
0


0 δ(l + h)

h
l
0
0




h(1 − δ)
1 − h + δτ (1 − l)





l(1 − δ) 
1−l
1






 2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l) 

0
0






δ(l + h)
0

(B.6)



h(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1))


 l(2 − h − l + δ(1 − l)(τ − 1)) 
1


=

.

(l + h)(2 − l − h + τ δ(1 − l)) 
0




δ(l + h)(1 − l)

82

(B.7)

